This is an AI-generated translation from Spanish to English; slight variations from the original text may occur.
Colombia is awaiting a decision from President Donald Trump’s White House and other federal agencies regarding whether it will be decertified as an ally in the war on drugs or given another opportunity to achieve the drug-control figures the United States requires.
A man well-versed in the issue and in Colombia’s battle against drug trafficking during the administration of former President George W. Bush, John Walters, spoke with Semana and shared his perspective on the possible consequences Colombia could face if such a critical decision is made—one with profound implications for the future of the country’s fight against criminal organizations.
Walters served as the White House’s so-called drug czar under President Bush, leading the Office of National Drug Control Policy. He is deeply familiar with Colombia and visited the country multiple times during the administration of former President Álvaro Uribe Vélez.
Walters also served as chief of staff for the US Department of Education under the Reagan administration. Today, he is the president and CEO of the Hudson Institute, a prestigious research center based in the United States.
Semana: What is your opinion on the possibility that the United States may withdraw Colombia’s certification in the fight against drugs?
John Walters (J.W.): I think it’s a real possibility. Unfortunately, I believe the situation has reached a point where U.S. law requires the administration—the president and the State Department—to tell the truth about whether or not a country is fully cooperating.
Sadly, based on my extensive experience with Colombia’s leaders during the Bush administration—and even earlier, under President Bush Sr.—I believe that the current president of Colombia and his leadership have created a disaster for the country. It has led to a dire situation for Colombia’s security, one that inevitably spills over into the United States and other countries. It’s an extremely serious problem. The explosion in production is unprecedented.
I reviewed the UN figures, and they are nearly 10 times higher than the lowest point recorded after I left office. And this is poison—a poison that contaminates Colombia and kills and harms people around the world.
Semana: In what way would a potential decertification affect security and defense cooperation between Bogotá and Washington, considering the historical ties between both nations?
J.W.: It’s unclear how decertification would be implemented. As you may know, the law allows for counternarcotics cooperation to continue. There could still be intelligence sharing, with support from other law enforcement agencies.
When I worked with Colombia, extradition was a common tool to remove dangerous individuals who had committed crimes both in the United States and in Colombia. There could also be some flexibility on the part of the U.S. president regarding how assistance continues to flow, depending on what is deemed beneficial for both the U.S. and Colombia.
But I believe that decertification typically signals a clear statement by the United States—a statement that the leader of a partner nation is failing to take the drug problem seriously, to the detriment of both their own people and the United States. It’s an effort to get things back on track, and there is some flexibility in how it’s applied to achieve that goal.
Semana: You were familiar with Colombia’s past counternarcotics strategy. Do you believe it was effective? How does it compare to the current one?
J.W.: It was effective. It was a model for what could be done. I was in Colombia during President George W. Bush’s administration and worked directly on the ground there.
I also served as director of drug policy under President Bush. Colombia’s leadership at the time was serious about tackling the issue. They targeted criminal organizations and, as I mentioned earlier, extradition was part of that effort.
I believe Colombia became the fastest-growing economy in Latin America during that period. Once progress began, I became the first drug policy director to visit Medellín and Cali—places that had previously been off-limits to someone in my position. According to surveys and general behavior, Colombians felt safer and believed in a more promising future.
It pains me deeply to witness the suffering and destruction drug cartels now cause, and how this is spreading into Venezuela and other countries. It’s a terrible, multifaceted threat that, unfortunately, originates from Colombian production.
I believe part of this is ideological, based on what I see, and driven by the false belief that peace can be achieved without confronting these dangerous cartels and the terrorists who run them.
Nobody likes violence, of course. But when violence is your main threat, you cannot simply wish it away. You can’t love the problem into submission. You need to create real consequences for violent actions.
Semana: If Colombia moves away from its traditional drug control strategy, what impact could that have on US policy toward Latin America and, especially, on regional cooperation in the fight against drug trafficking?
J.W.: I think it’s a complete unknown. Since around 2010 or 2011, we’ve seen a dramatic deterioration in Colombia. The same happened in Mexico. When I worked with Colombia, I also collaborated with President Calderón in Mexico.
There were real security gains and even cooperation between Mexico and Colombia. But then things worsened in Mexico, and today the country is struggling to regain control.
It’s a tough situation. No country wants foreign interference, as it touches on sovereignty. That’s why the most successful U.S. programs worked alongside strong leadership in Colombia, Mexico, and other Andean and Central American nations, equipping them to confront narco-traffickers and violent terrorists.
Cooperation is best. The danger lies in hostility toward cooperation—and in corruption. Drug traffickers using money or violence to impose their will must be stopped.
It requires a joint effort. The U.S. can provide resources, but leadership must come from Colombia and its elected officials, who must be accountable to their own people.
Semana: Do you believe a potential decertification would directly affect the US government?
J.W.: I don’t think so. Drug trafficking is already at horrific levels—much worse than when I was in office. This measure would be an attempt to correct the course.
My concern, though I don’t know if it will happen, is that decertification could affect trade. During my tenure, we worked hard to establish a free trade agreement with Colombia, reducing tariffs on key products such as flowers. If trade were to be used as a sanction, it would be devastating for Colombia, far more so than for the United States.
Semana: Finally, Mr. Walters, in today’s context, what advice would you give to President Petro if he were standing in front of you?
J.W.: I think the essential point is not complicated. The problem is that many people get trapped in ideology. They want the world to be the way they imagine it, rather than accepting reality.
Narco-terrorists must be brought to justice. Many of them are extremely violent. You need professional security forces and law enforcement agencies equipped to confront this threat and protect the public.
This has been done before. The lessons from President Uribe’s administration are among the most successful examples of drug control anywhere in the world. Colombia already has this experience from not so long ago.
It’s true that former President Uribe is now facing legal troubles, but he could still be consulted on what should be done today. That would be a significant political step for the current president. But the threat to Colombia—and to its alliance with the United States—is both real and urgent.
Now is the time to “break glass in case of emergency” and apply bold solutions. Colombia must return to working with those who once knew how to do things right, to correct its course and secure a better future.