The war in Iran has resulted in no shortage of geopolitical consequences for policymakers around the globe. From high energy prices to key shipping lanes being closed, leaders from Europe to the Middle East to Australia are scrambling to mitigate the negative impact. However, another consequence beginning to gain attention as a result of the war in Iran is the breakdown in transatlantic relations.
US President Donald Trump has repeatedly criticized the lack of willingness of Washington’s NATO allies to dispatch a naval flotilla to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, and Secretary of State Marco Rubio has complained that some of America’s European partners are restricting the use of air bases for operations against Iran.
This breakdown in transatlantic relations comes at a difficult time for the alliance. We are now inside the 100-day countdown to the next NATO summit in July, to be held in Ankara. Coincidentally, NATO has already been responsible for shooting down four Iranian missiles aimed at Turkiye, making the upcoming summit the first time the alliance has had to protect the airspace of a host nation.
Clearly, it will not be business as usual. Any agenda that diplomats have been working on behind the scenes in the lead-up must now be set aside. Instead of the alliance focusing on an ambitious and robust agenda, it is time to lower expectations and focus on mending the transatlantic relationship.
This is where it is fortuitous that the summit will be held in Turkiye. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been able to use his leadership to bridge different parts of the alliance in recent years and has cultivated a good relationship with Trump, which could work to the advantage of other European leaders. The summit will test Erdogan’s statecraft in this regard.
It is clear that the war in Iran is the main focus of the US and Trump. Even if the fighting were to stop tomorrow, the geopolitical consequences would be felt for months. Keeping this in mind, NATO should tailor the upcoming summit to address this reality.
In addition to getting the US-European relationship back on track, there are two other policy areas that should be immediately obvious.
The first is finding common ground on air defense. The lessons of the war in Ukraine, combined with Iran’s attacks on the Gulf states, highlight the difficulties of defending airspace in modern warfare. Challenges range from shortcomings in the defense industrial base, which struggles to produce weapons quickly enough, to the need for systems that have the technological edge required to destroy ballistic missiles and drones in a cost-effective manner. NATO should develop a comprehensive strategy on air defense that addresses these issues across the alliance.
The second area is deepening relations with the Gulf states. The last time NATO held a summit in Turkiye was in 2004 in Istanbul, which resulted in the historic Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. This framework now serves as the main platform for NATO engagement with the Gulf. However, in the years since, little has been done in practical terms to advance the strategy.
NATO should seize the opportunity presented by again holding a summit in Turkiye, combined with the current geopolitical situation in the Gulf, to reinvigorate this initiative. Doing so would help bring NATO and the Gulf states closer together and make the alliance more relevant to Trump at a time when he is questioning NATO’s value.
This also connects to the issue of air defense. As Ukrainian experts have deployed to the Gulf to offer assistance, it is clear that there is a shared interest, stretching from the Gulf of Finland to the Gulf of Oman, in ensuring that the skies are protected.
Regardless, one thing is certain: the NATO summit matters. Despite the rhetoric coming from Washington, it is unlikely that the US will leave the alliance that has supported transatlantic relations for more than seven decades. A unilateral withdrawal by Trump would not only be politically unpopular, but also legally difficult. In 2023, Rubio, then a US senator, led an effort to pass legislation making it illegal for any president to unilaterally withdraw from the alliance without two-thirds approval from the Senate. At present, there is no indication that the Senate would support such a move.
There is also a broader geopolitical reality to consider. Europe remains too important for the US economically for disengagement to be a viable option. A recent report by the US Chamber of Commerce found that 48 out of 50 states export more to Europe than to China, and that almost 60 percent of all foreign investment into the US comes from Europe, supporting millions of American jobs. Put simply, NATO serves as the primary security guarantor of America’s largest export market, and placing this at risk is not in the country’s interest.
While transatlantic relations may seem strained today, the alliance has endured similar upheavals in the past and ultimately emerged stronger. During the Suez crisis in 1956, deep divisions between the US and key European allies exposed serious fractures within the Western alliance. In 1966, Charles de Gaulle withdrew France from NATO’s integrated military command, forcing the alliance to relocate its headquarters from Paris to Brussels. Disagreements over the Iraq war in 2003 again strained transatlantic ties. More recently, concerns at the start of Trump’s first term resulted in increased European defense spending and renewed attention on burden sharing in NATO.
As policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic scramble to assemble a workable agenda for the summit in light of developments in the Middle East, ambitions must be tempered. Realistic and achievable goals should be established, particularly in areas that matter to Trump. With sufficient creativity and political will, this can be done.