Pakistan’s general election, held on Feb. 8, has plunged the country into an even deeper crisis than it already faced.
The country’s all-powerful military leaders did not get the result they ostensibly sought: a clear victory for the conservative Pakistan Muslim League (PML) — the party of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, the generals’ one-time nemesis. Instead, Pakistani voters expressed their disenchantment with the entrenched establishment as well as with dynastic politics by voting for independents affiliated with the Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf (PTI) — the party of populist former Prime Minister Imran Khan, who is currently in prison for corruption.
71-year-old Khan’s mostly young supporters overcame many odds, including severe repression and exclusion of PTI from the list of parties eligible to identify their candidates on the ballot paper by party affiliation. Having won with the backing of the military in the 2018 election, when Sharif and his supporters were in prison, Khan defied the powerful institution after being removed from office through a parliamentary vote of no confidence in April 2022. He built a powerful narrative of victimhood, based partly on anti-American conspiracy theories.
But Khan’s success in swaying voters fed up with corruption, economic dysfunction and years of military meddling in politics will not end Pakistan’s instability. It might, in fact, further aggravate the crisis.
Election results have given Khan’s allies more seats than any other party, but it is not a majority. In keeping with the tradition of populists all over the world, Khan and his PTI have abused and ridiculed other parties for so long that no one seems willing to join PTI in a coalition. Even in 2018, PTI only found coalition partners with the help of the military establishment.
Khan’s party claims it has been cheated out of an absolute majority, and its emotionally charged supporters seem willing to take to the streets to demand acceptance of the PTI’s right to form the government. There is no doubt that PTI was denied a level playing field in the elections, as has been the case with any party disfavored by the military establishment in previous Pakistani elections. But past victims of the establishment negotiated with other political parties, bargained with the military and found a way forward.
Each of Pakistan’s major political figures has, at one time or another, colluded with the generals to secure a share in the country’s government. Each one has also been the victim of the high-handedness of the permanent state structure. The ideal outcome for Pakistan would be for the military to withdraw from politics and for politicians to work out compromises with each other, rather than letting the military be the final arbiter of political disputes.
But that seems like even more of a pipedream after the Feb. 8 elections. The entire premise of Imran Khan’s politics has been that his political rivals are either crooks or traitors. He has always preferred dealing with the military and will now want to leverage his popularity for greater power for himself. His political rivals, meanwhile, seem inclined to get together with the military’s blessings and form the next coalition government.
Ironically, although voters may have wanted to rebuke the military elite, the behavior of various political actors, including Khan, might set the stage for continuing the military’s political role. Barring a willingness among politicians to negotiate in good faith, coalition politics will still need someone to broker deals. And if there is violence in the streets, people might clamor again for the military to restore order.
Meanwhile, amid personality-driven politics, Pakistan’s politicians have completely ignored the nation’s economy and frayed foreign relations. Pakistan has to pay back $28 billion in loans over the next two years. It might have to borrow yet again to service existing loans and avoid bankruptcy.
The new government will have to negotiate a new bailout package with the International Monetary Fund and seek support from Pakistan’s traditional backers — China, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. All the donors agree that Pakistan must implement economic reforms before they agree to lend it more money. A government of national unity might be better placed to negotiate with lenders. Instead, Pakistan’s politics are more polarized than ever, its society more fragmented.
The United States has done well by staying away from Pakistan’s electoral fray, beyond demanding an investigation into allegations of election irregularities and saying that the U.S. will work with whichever elected government takes office. U.S. interest in Pakistan has diminished significantly since the withdrawal from Afghanistan, as has American military and economic assistance.
There is a strong streak of anti-Americanism that runs across the political spectrum in Pakistan. Past American efforts to support democracy have only fueled conspiracy theories. Khan, for example, blew up what was a normal diplomatic exchange into a vote-getting conspiracy theory about a U.S. plot against him.
Some American members of Congress, influenced by lobbying from their Pakistani-American constituents, might want a more proactive American role in Pakistan’s internal affairs. But nothing good will come of it from the U.S. point of view. While Pakistan goes through internal convulsions that are not conducive to U.S. engagement beyond what is absolutely necessary, American officials must limit themselves to reiterating their support for Pakistan’s stability and democracy.