A Conversation on US-Azerbaijan Relations with Ambassador Elchin Amirbayov

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Hudson Senior Fellows Michael Doran and Luke Coffey host Ambassador Elchin Amirbayov, the representative of the president of the Republic of Azerbaijan on special assignments, to discuss the current state of United States–Azerbaijan relations and peace negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Event Transcript

This transcription is automatically generated and edited lightly for accuracy. Please excuse any errors.

Michael Doran:

Hi, I’m Mike Doran. I am a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, and I’m also the Director of the Center for Peace and Security in the Middle East, and I’m joined with my colleague on the other end here, Senior Fellow Luke Coffey. It’s our great privilege and honor to host Ambassador Elchin Amirbayov. He is the representative of the President of Azerbaijan for special affairs? Special assignments, which sounds very, very interesting. Special assignments. In our system, when you have a special assignment, it means you’re doing things that are cloak and dagger.

Ambassador Elchin Amirbayov:

No. We’re humbler.

Michael Doran:

Ambassador Amirbayov has a distinguished diplomatic career. He was the ambassador to France, to the Holy See, to the Swiss Federation and many other assignments. Today he’s going to talk to us about the state of US-Azerbaijani relations, and also the state of the Azerbaijani-Armenian peace process. With that, why don’t you just give us an overview as you see it, of where the peace process stands at this point.

Ambassador Elchin Amirbayov:

Thank you, Mike. Thank you, Luke. I appreciate this opportunity to be here. Indeed, I think when we look at the current state of the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan, we should mention that we have made a substantial progress towards finalizing a peace deal. We have never been as close to this as never before. So I think there is a historic opportunity right now for both countries to finally close this chapter of animosity and to engage in changing the nature of the region of South Caucasus and to make it a place of good neighborness and good neighborhood and stability and peace.

So of course, as you know, this process has been going on for a long period of time. We had almost three decades of mediation, but as of last December, we, both countries, decided that the best, the most efficient and most promising format to continue the talks and to finalize them would be to do that in the purely bilateral direct format. And ever since, there were some significant achievements, including in terms of building confidence, but also in initiating certain processes like the exchange of diplomatic support, but also including the release of some detainees and the practical commencements of the delimitation process of the border.

So I think that now if we look at the text of the peace agreement that is on the table, we are very close to finalizing it and it’s Azerbaijan’s intention to do its best in order to meet the expectations of the whole international community, but also to once and for all resolve this issue which is at the core of this rivalry and conflict with Armenia, that is the Armenian territorial claims to Azerbaijan. So we hope that the remaining difficulties will be addressed properly in the short period of time and that we can attain a credible, endurable, and irreversible peace.

Michael Doran:

When you say short period of time, could I push you on that? Would you want to speculate? Do you think you could have it done by September, by the COP meeting in Baku?

Ambassador Elchin Amirbayov:

Well, to give some timelines is always an ungrateful thing because there have been so many times in the past that people mention concrete deadlines. It will very much depend on the ability and the willingness of the Armenian side to address the only remaining impediments to finalizing a peace deal. And that is to address the constitutionally embedded territorial claims to Azerbaijan, because otherwise we do not see any insurmountable difficulty in terms of the text of the peace agreement. As it was mentioned recently, most of it has been agreed upon, the remaining issues are all doable, but we cannot go ahead and sign the peace deal with turning a blind eye to the very existential reason of this conflict and that is the fact that Armenia had territorial claims to us, and these claims are still valid in accordance with their constitutional legal framework. So the sooner that issue is addressed, the sooner we will get to the final phase.

Luke Coffey:

Mr. Ambassador, I want to echo Mike’s welcome here for you at Hudson Institute. It’s always great to see you.

Ambassador Elchin Amirbayov:

Thank you.

Luke Coffey:

I was out west in Las Vegas last week speaking at an event on the NATO Summit. And on the sidelines of that event, I was speaking to someone about the South Caucasus and they mentioned Armenia and Azerbaijan, and I said to them, “Can you believe that they’re so close to finally normalizing relations and agreeing to a peace deal?” And the gentleman didn’t know this. He was surprised to learn this, and in fact, at first he didn’t believe it until I explained it to him. This to me tells me that if this seemingly well-informed American who would attend such a conference where I was speaking didn’t know about this, most American policymakers probably don’t know. Why should Americans care that Armenia and Azerbaijan are finally on the cusp of securing a lasting peace deal and what can US Policymakers be doing more of to help facilitate this and encourage this?

Ambassador Elchin Amirbayov:

Well, actually one of the questions to this answer is because United States has always played an important role in promoting stability and good neighborly relations in this big of region. This is Caspian region, including South Caucasus. And here I should say that in terms of our bilateral relations with the United States, we have always appreciated the unwavering support that the US gave to Azerbaijan’s political independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. We have three decades plus of very intensive cooperation in a number of fields. We have a longstanding and very fruitful cooperation in the energy field. But also we’re together in addressing major regional and international security challenges. As you know, Azerbaijani soldiers were fighting shoulder to shoulder with Americans in such hot spots as Afghanistan, Kosovo, Iraq, and we were the last ones who left the Kabul airport. So we have shown throughout the decades that we are and could be considered credible partners to the United States.

So it’s the interest of the US, Which also enjoys good relations with Armenia that two of these nations in a seemingly remote geographical region of South Caucasus, that they finally overcome their conflict and rivalry and basically they usher in a new era for prosperity, stability and development in this region. So that’s one of the reasons why the US cares and we commend the efforts of the United States to facilitate further progress. I believe that in these turbulent times, it’s always gratifying to find at least one spot in the world where there is a good opportunity for peace and the positive resolution of an issue that could be found.

Luke Coffey:

And turning specifically to the proposed peace agreement with Armenia and the normalization. As I understand it, there are three big issues, one you already addressed, which was the constitutional issue with Armenia’s constitution. The other two, as I see them, are the status of a transit corridor, or a Zangezur Corridor, that could allow Azerbaijan proper to link up in some form of transport to the Nakhchivan, the enclave, Azerbaijan’s enclave. And then the other issue being the delineation of the full border.

And as part of that last point, I know that four villages were recently returned to Azerbaijan. This was seen as a big confidence-building measure, a great act on the side of the Armenians to hand these villages over. I often hear in Washington people talk about these as being enclaves, but they weren’t enclaves. They were part of the contiguous Azerbaijani territory. But I know that there are some enclaves that exists between Armenia and Azerbaijan. I think there were three in total, one Armenian and two Azerbaijani, or I may have that backwards. But what’s the status of these? Are these being discussed as part of the peace deal? Is the Zangezur Corridor being discussed? Besides the constitutional issue, how much more progress has to be made?

Ambassador Elchin Amirbayov:

Well, actually with regard to those villages that you refer to, the four villages in Kazakh region of Azerbaijan, they are not exclave villages. These are the villages which were under illegal occupation by Armenia since early ‘90s. And basically the gentleman’s agreement on their liberation or evacuation by Armenian forces was reached back in November 2020. It wasn’t reflected in the trilateral statement on ceasefire.

Luke Coffey:

Interesting.

Ambassador Elchin Amirbayov:

But it was done in the presence of a third party, which also signed this document. So I think that to portray this as a big concession or as a brave act by Armenia would not be very factually correct because they delayed the implementation of this commitment for three and a half years. But they did it and we welcomed that act because we believe that also helped to strengthen the atmosphere around the peace talks.

With regard to the remaining second group of villages, there are four more villages. All four of them are exclave villages. Three of them are Azerbaijani and one is Armenian in our territory. But the mutual understanding from both parties is that this issue would be better off if it’s treated within the framework of the delimitation process.

Luke Coffey:

Right. Okay.

Ambassador Elchin Amirbayov:

So since the progress already has been made in delimitating and even demarcating the first segment of that future border between the two countries, I think at some point in time both delegations will decide that it’s time to tackle this one. But I think that it should not be portrayed as a big obstacle or difficulty because there is a common understanding that this is part of the broader process.

If I may just say a word about what I refer to as this transit or Zangezur Corridor. For us, I think that if we speak about a long-term, sustainable, and irreversible peace, the opening of this transportation link, namely the railroad, which existed by the way in the Soviet Union time. It’s a 26 miles long railroad. Its reopening is one of those immediate deliverables of peace, which could be to the benefit not only of Azerbaijan, but more even so to the benefit of Armenia.

Because basically, as you know, because of the occupation of Azerbaijani lands for almost three decades, Armenia was completely isolated in the region. It was deprived of any participation, any economic projects in South Caucasus. And actually this can change the situation. It could be a game changer for the whole region. They can also put their name back on the geoeconomic and geopolitical map. This also will allow us to put an end to an isolated situation in which 500,000 Azerbaijanis living in Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic might be re-linked with the main part of Azerbaijan. So I think that it’s a win-win project. On top of that, we hear a lot Armenian government speaking about this famous project of crossroads of peace. I think that the only way to implement that would be to allow Armenia to have two out of its four borders which are closed to open. And that is only if they basically come up with a viable solution that would envisage the security of passage of Azerbaijani citizens through that portion of Armenian territory. So we very much look forward that this will happen.

And I think that among other things, this reopening of that route may serve as a confidence building measure between the two countries because it will, to a certain extent, increase the interdependence of them. And one of the best guarantees for peace to stay is when both parties have something to lose if they renege on their commitments. And we already have more on this first issue, which is the constitutional conundrum. I think that we have always to understand that this is the raison d’etre, as they say, the real reason of this decades-long rivalry and confrontation between Armenia and Azerbaijan. So without addressing this existential problem to Azerbaijani security, it would be naive to think that this peace could be credible or it could be endurable or it could be irreversible.

Unfortunately, we still are not reassured about the sincerity of Armenian authorities when they say that they have abandoned their territorial claims to Azerbaijan because there is a clear discrepancy between their rhetoric, official public rhetoric, between their commitment to sign the peace agreement, the letter and spirit of which basically excludes the possibility of territorial claims, and the existing situation with a constitutional legal framework. So this contradiction needs to be resolved so that could open the road, the path, towards eventual peace.

Luke Coffey:

Mike, if I may a quick follow up on this. It’s a very interesting point in the beginning about these four villages being part of a gentleman’s agreement and didn’t make it into that final three-party ceasefire agreement in November of 2020. Why was that? Why wasn’t this more explicit or more public facing?

Ambassador Elchin Amirbayov:

Well, actually I wasn’t obviously there, but what I’ve heard was the fact that the third party thought that-

Luke Coffey:

The third party being Russia.

Ambassador Elchin Amirbayov:

Russia, it may basically make it even more difficult for Pashinyan to have this clause also reflected in this trilateral statement because he already was committing to withdraw his troops from Malekan, from Kelbajar and from Agdam region. So basically it was a kind of a request to allow him to deal with this issue without necessarily putting into public.

Luke Coffey:

Right.

Ambassador Elchin Amirbayov:

But unfortunately it took him three and a half years almost to live up to this promise.

Luke Coffey:

Yeah, I see. That clarifies a lot of that. Thank you.

Michael Doran:

Following up on that, my view of the Armenian dilemma, and I’m presenting this because I’d love to see if it comports with your understanding of the problem is that there are within Armenia, or within the Armenian world, maybe, if it’s better, more accurate to say, there are two rival conceptions of Armenia that are battling it out.

One conception focuses on the actual country of 3 million people that exists next to you. And the other one is an idea of a greater Armenia that excites the imagination of lots of Armenians, in particular the Karabakh Armenians, and the diaspora, the diaspora in Glendale, in Marseille, and in Moscow. And they are committed to this dream of Armenia that doesn’t actually exist. And Prime Minister Pashinyan represents actual Armenia that exists. But in terms of making policy, he has to contend with both. He can’t simply make policy on the basis of the actual Armenia. He has to pay lip service to and deference to the greater Armenian idea, because the diaspora has influenced Armenian politics, the Karabakh Armenians inside Armenia have influence. And outside powers are also interested in promoting the greater Armenian idea because it serves their interests. And so when you insist on the constitutional change, that’s really forces Armenia to make once and for all a decision to make its policy based on the country that actually exists and to abandon these wider aspirations. So my first question is that how you understand the dilemma?

Ambassador Elchin Amirbayov:

Well, actually, yes. I would refer your first question to the statement which was made by Prime Minister Pashinyan some time ago where he invited his population to abandon the idea of some Armenia which is based on phantasms and to deal with the real Armenia and to make sure that this real Armenia survives and remains as a state. So I think that he also realizes that this is a challenge that he has to face. Now with regard to how difficult it is for him to come up with constitutional amendments, I think that we should also not forget that the most difficult part was already done by him when he openly acknowledged that he has no territorial claims to Azerbaijan. He even cited the number of square meters and kilometers of territory which he considers to be the territory of our country. He also, through his foreign minister, agreed on the five fundamental basic principles that were put into as a basis of the draft peace agreement, one of which is mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity, sovereignty, and abandoning now and in the future of any territorial claims.

So the most difficult part in order to pass over the message has been done by him. Now, what is expected from him is to bring into conformity his rhetoric and his political statement, which I acknowledge is a way forward, with a real situation on the ground. Because if he just will say that it’s going to be difficult for me to address this issue only because I may have certain difficulties back home, I mean for us it is a poor consolation. So basically we expect him to deliver on the official position that he, as the Prime Minister has already declared, that is Karabakh is part of Azerbaijan’s internationally recognized territory, and Armenia has no claims on that, and that they are ready on the basis of this premise to normalize relations with their neighbor and even neighbors because of course, normalization between Armenia and Turkiye also is very much linked to the progress between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

So I don’t think that this is something which may be portrayed as an existential challenge for him. What is needed is just an amendment which would basically address the, as I said earlier, the real reason of this rivalry. Because I mean, imagine if we go ahead and we sign it and then I mean after a certain period of time, a new government of Armenia comes to power and then they will say that, “Well, the one which was signed by the previous Prime Minister.”

Michael Doran:

It’s not legitimate.

Ambassador Elchin Amirbayov:

“It is not legitimate because it contradicts the letter and spirit of our constitution.” And according to Armenia constitution, the Constitution has a supreme legal force. So obviously any constitutional court, if it has to pronounce itself on the nature of this peace agreements, it should say that it is in contradiction so therefore it could not be ratified. So that means that we will leave a door open for the future return for this revanchist rhetoric, and we see it’s getting more and more hold in Armenia today. So that’s why I think it is an issue which could not be ignored by anyone who really wishes peace to take place.

Michael Doran:

Let me ask you a little bit about outside powers, and I want to ask in particular about one.

Ambassador Elchin Amirbayov:

I know which one.

Michael Doran:

No, you probably don’t.

Ambassador Elchin Amirbayov:

Okay, go.

Michael Doran:

France.

Ambassador Elchin Amirbayov:

Ah, okay.

Luke Coffey:

I had a different country in mind as well.

Michael Doran:

I want to get to the others as we go. You thought I was going to bring up Iran. But I will, I will. After Luke perhaps. But there’s no one better to explain French-Azerbaijani relations to us than yourself. And the developments there lately have been amazing. The Azerbaijani-French conflict in New Caledonia, for example, is really, I think a surprise to everyone. Can you, to the extent it’s possible for you, can you just give us a sense of what role France is playing in this question of the particular of the constitutional amendment and the greater Armenia versus the actual Armenia? What are they doing? Why are they doing it? And do you see them as playing a spoiler role?

Ambassador Elchin Amirbayov:

Well, you mentioned Caledonia. I think that it would be correct to refer to the point of departure of this deterioration, not that one, but the stance which was adopted by France since the beginning of the second Karabakh war. And we have seen that if during previous decades they tried to keep a kind of semblance of even-handed approach, I mean this time around they decided to completely invest themselves in supporting one of the two belligerent countries. So I think that that should be referred as the starting point of what we are observing today.

With regard to what they think about this constitutional amendment, it’s a bit difficult for me to say something because my guess may be as good as yours. Because as a matter of fact, formally France is no way is involved, at least visibly, in the peace process today. As I mentioned, not only because of what’s happening in bilateral relations between Azerbaijan and France, but also because it was the deliberate decision of both countries to continue and to finalize the peace process within the direct bilateral format. Of course, as a country which is very close to Armenia, they may have certain ideas about this and how they would like this to be settled, but it’s very hard for me to comment on that.

Michael Doran:

Well, let me maybe be, pardon me, Luke, one more, just a little more pointed about it. What is it that specifically that you’re seeing from France that has pushed the tensions between or has increased the tensions so dramatically between two of you?

Ambassador Elchin Amirbayov:

Well, it’s not difficult. You just have to look at the long list of those steps which were considered quite hostile by Azerbaijan ever since the conflict started, the positions which were expressed publicly, both at the level of executive power, but also the two chambers of their Parliament, and not to speak about municipalities and other kind of segments of their public. So this position is not warranted because I mean, it’s not based on the respect of international law because what Azerbaijan did during 44 days back in 2020 was to restore justice. And Azerbaijan basically through this 44-day successful military operation, which was as a reaction to the Armenian provocation, it restored its territorial integrity. So basically what the whole international community failed to do, including through the Institute of Mediation of OSCE Minsk group for 28 years, Azerbaijan did it itself. So to hold this biased position against not only Azerbaijan but also against international law is not something which, as I say, is understandable and warranted.

So I think that that is the core reason of this deterioration, because I mean, in previous times, I mean I remember on my watch as ambassador in France, we had a very advanced level of these relations. We were engaged in regular and very intensive political dialogue. Economic relations were on the rise. We had lots of French companies present in Azerbaijan, but also cultural, humanitarian, and other fields also were very much up to the quality of political dialogue. So I think that I hope that this position which is hostile towards Azerbaijan will be ended and that France, like the rest of the international community, will basically accept the new realities in the region. It will also finally accept the new status quo because the idea of Azerbaijan is to have an inclusive model of South Caucasus, which is based on good neighborly relations, on sustainable and irreversible peace and stability.

So I think that if someone wants to help in these circumstances Armenia, it has to first of all encourage Armenia to stay on the course towards peaceful resolution and not to lose its motivation to participate in peace talks and in contacts like it was the case very recently during the EPC Summit in Blenheim in UK when Prime Minister Pashinyan basically rejected the proposal by our British hosts to participate in a trilateral meeting with participation of new British Prime Minister Keir Starmer. So I think without talking to each other, without accepting all the proposals to continue this dialogue, it’s difficult to expect that the remainder of this road towards peace could be achieved.

Luke Coffey:

You mentioned Turkiye and Armenia also in talks to normalize and reopen the border. I think it was 1993 when Turkiye closed that border with Armenia over Armenia’s actions in the first Karabakh war. And now we are seeing even today, I believe today, a Turkish and Armenian officials meeting at that border to discuss this reopening. Do you think that Armenia and Azerbaijani normalization and Turkiye-Armenia normalization have to run in parallel alongside one another for the region to fully receive the benefits of foreign investment, economic development, more transit routes? Or do you think one could succeed with the other remaining frozen or unsettled?

Ambassador Elchin Amirbayov:

Well, as it was mentioned many times by official Baku, I think that our approach towards resolving of all remaining difficulties and problems and challenges in the region is a rather holistic one. So I think that our Turkish friends, they also realize that improvement of relations between Armenia and Turkiye is very much linked to the progress which could be achieved between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Because I mean, the very reason why, as you mentioned yourself, of the fact that the borders were closed back in ‘93 was the fact of the Armenia’s aggression and occupation.

So technically speaking, unless we sign a peace agreement, and unless we are finalizing this peace deal and we eliminate all the possible challenges to sustainability of this peace, it would be premature for me to speak about the expediency of putting a cart in front of the horse as they say. And I think that we are on the same page with our Turkish friends because they also realize that this issue of territorial claims in this region of South Caucasus needs to be treated immediately. And any steps which might complicate already very fragile atmosphere around the peace process should be avoided.

Michael Doran:

I’m always amazed at the openness and frankness of President Aliyev, and he recently in Baku in a meeting with press and think tank representatives had some very pointed criticisms of US policy. I was a bit surprised by it and I wonder if you could give us a sense of what’s happened to generate that frustration and do you think your trip here now is going to bring about a different result?

Ambassador Elchin Amirbayov:

Well, I think Mr. President was quite eloquent about the dynamics and the origins of this position that he expressed. But at the same time, we also realized that both countries, US And Azerbaijan, have recently reiterated their commitment, full commitment, to develop further and to deepen this very important relationship. Both parties, they see enormous potential which is not tapped in order to elevate the quality of this relations to a completely new level. At the same time, as they say, among friends, we are always frank. So I mean, he also wanted to say that if indeed this relationship is important to the United States, we also expect that this relationship should be given its credit where the credit is due and it should not be confounded with some other external factors. In other words, I mean, it should not be carried out through the prism of relationship with Armenia.

We all understand the political sensitivities, especially at this particular moment, pre-election period in the United States. But I think that our expectation is that the United States will duly assess the potential and the possible positive implications of upgrading and deepening relations with Azerbaijan at this particular period in time, where, as I said in the South Caucasus, we are witnessing in our new geopolitical reality, we see a new status quo, and we all understand, I think many would agree that Azerbaijan is doomed to play a key, and I would say a linchpin role in this region. So I think that if we want to see this region to be in peace and stability and prosperity, of course the interests, the vital national interests of Azerbaijan, need to be respected. And I think that if we look at, go back to the peace process, I already said that it’s a purely bilateral thing, and the format which was chosen by two countries, if someone wants to really promote peace, our expectation is that these parties would refrain from any actions which may be construed as creating unfavorable environment around the peace talks.

And I think that in this regard, we expect that Armenia will not be demotivated from staying engaged in the peace process by some new events or developments which we are observing in this region. Of course, I think that it’s true that we are witnessing today efforts to help Armenia build up its military potential, be it through bilateral channels or through, for example, European Union’s EPF, European Peace Fund initiative, pumping Armenia with military assistance including lethal weapons at the stage when peace process is living through a very historic and crucial moment, I think is not very responsible towards peace. And I think that instead of trying to strengthen the resilience of Armenia by helping it kind of militarily or expanding its military potential, I think those who are in favor of peace, or the real friends of peace, they would be better off if they would just stop doing that but encourage on the contrary Armenia, to do whatever it needs to do so that this historic opportunity for peace is not missed.

Michael Doran:

So if I could just repeat back to you what I heard, and you can tell me if I got it right because I heard two major messages there. One is support the peace process by refraining from building up the forces in Armenia that are against the peace deal. And number two, this is where I’m a little bit more of a question, I heard you say to the United States that you would like the US-Azerbaijani relationship to have a status all its own, and that relations with Azerbaijan will not always be held hostage to US-Armenian relations, that there’ll be a kind of separate bilateral track with its own agenda and its own set of concerns.

Ambassador Elchin Amirbayov:

Yes. If I may reinterpret what you interpreted, I said first I meant that it would be advisable and what we can expect is that at this very important moment in the peace process, anyone who really wants to help these two nations to finally close this chapter of animosity, we expect them to be even-handed and balanced in their approach. So that’s why we should not send any wrong messages to Armenia that they can engage in some delaying tactics or imitation of participation in the peace process, but using this pause in order to restore their military potential and then to go back to anew to square one.

And secondly, I think that yes, we believe that potential of US-Azerbaijani relations is big. Besides traditional fields where we have so successfully collaborated, be it energy, energy security, be it international and regional security matters, including fight against terror. There are many others, digital transformation, this green energy transformation. I mean, we very much value excellent cooperation which exists between Azerbaijani COP 29 presidency and the United States delegation. We expect full-fledged participation of the United States in November when we will be hosting this global event. I think that there are other fields like humanitarian, cultural, agriculture, economic and trade issues on which we can look anew. So the time has come when the approach of to this relationship will be rather merit-based. It would be even-handed. And when Azerbaijan could be offered a level playing field, and by this, this could help us all untap the unused potential.

So for that, we need to deal with certain irritants and some of the difficulties in our relations. Of course, you know very well about this section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, which was adopted back in ‘92 when Azerbaijani territories were one after another getting under Armenian military control, so we still believe it’s not a helpful and indiscriminate decision, which basically was waived for long periods of time. And we hope that the understanding will be restored in United States that this is unnecessary complication which should not be allowed to shadow the excellent prospects that we may have in our bilateral relationship. And it also should be mentioned that the recent exchange of letters between our presidents, but also recent visits, different high-level visits between Baku and Washington, they all abode well for the future development of this relationship because I think we are hearing clearly from the United States the willingness to reengage and to elevate relations with Azerbaijan to a qualitatively new level.

Luke Coffey:

I think we all agree 907 needs to be scrapped. And it was always politically motivated and driven, and it doesn’t help advance US national interests in the South Caucasus or the region. With everything going on in the world today, all the geopolitical challenges, one thing that the world could use is stabilization and normalization in the South Caucasus. Mike and I wish you and your delegation and your Armenian counterparts, good luck as everyone continues to find a lasting peace in this region. I want to thank our viewers today for tuning in for this important discussion about the situation in the South Caucasus. And I invite you to check out hudson.org if you want to learn more about some of the work Mike and I and our colleagues are doing on this region. Thank you very much and have a good day.